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JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONSt
Honorable B. Michael Dann* & Randall M, Hansen**
I. TRENDS IN JuDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS
Judicial retention elections have been part of the selection and
retention process in many states for over thirty years. Twenty states
use some form of judicial retention election for appellate court
judges and justices, and twelve states use retention elections for at
least some of their trial court judges.' Researchers and policy ana-
lysts have been able to identify trends in retention elections, some of
which are disturbing, if not alarming, and discuss remedies for the
problems that have beset this form of judicial election.
A. High Rates of Retention
The then relatively short history of judicial retention elections
limited a 1987 attempt by Aspin and Hall to describe trends in judi-
cial retention elections.2 That research included ten retention states
where trial judges stand for retention elections.3 The authors found
t This paper was prepared specifically for the Summit on Improving Ju-
dicial Selection. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the National Center for State
Court, the Joyce Foundation, or the Open Society Institute.
* Retired Superior Court Judge, County of Maricopa (Phoenix), Arizona
(1980-2000); Visiting Scholar, National Center for State Courts, Williamsburg,
Virginia.
** Court Research Analyst, National Center for State Courts, Williams-
burg, Virginia.
1. A brief history ofjudicial retention elections is available in the Appen-
dix to this paper for the reader who is unfamiliar vith their meaning, origin,
development, and variations.
2. See William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin, What Twenty Years of Judicial
Retention Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340 (1987).
3. See id. at 343.
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only twenty-two retention election defeats out of 1864 retention
elections (approximately 1%).
4
An update article published last year included an analysis of
3912 elections for the thirty-year period from 1964 to 1994 in the
same ten retention election states.5 Of those 3912, only fifty judges
were defeated (approximately 1%). Twenty-eight of those fifty
judges were defeated in Illinois, the only state that sets the threshold
for retention at 60%.6 Further, only one of the twenty-eight judges
defeated in Illinois received less than a 50% affirmative vote, the
more common threshold.7
B. Declining Total Affinnative Votes
While the existence of relatively few defeats in judicial retention
elections may provide some notion of security for judges, analysis of
affirmative vote trends reveals a different story. The average vote to
retain judges for states in the study fell almost fifteen percentage
points from 1964 to 1992, recovering only slightly in 1994.8 In
1964, the affirmative vote was almost 85%; in 1992, it was 69%.9
Although this figure is well above the threshold, even in Illinois, and
has not produced an explosion in the number of judicial retention
election defeats, the downward trend signals a greater vulnerability
to defeat than previously known in judicial retention elections.
C. Substantial "Rolloff" in Voting for Judges
"Rolloff' in voting is the tendency of voters to refrain from
voting on judges at all.' 0 Although abstention from voting for or
4. See id. at 344.
5. Larry Aspin & William K. Hall, Thirty Years of Judicial Retention
Elections: An Update, 37 Soc. Sci. J. 1, 3 (2000). The states included in the
study include Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, and Wyoming. See id.
6. See id. at 8-10.
7. See id. at 10. The rate of rejections ofjudges accelerated in Illinois. In
the five elections before 1986, ten judges were defeated-a rejection rate of
two per election. In more recent elections, between 1986 through 1994, eight-
een judges lost in retention elections-a rejection rate of three per election.
See id. at 9-10.
8. See id. at 4.
9. See id. at 5 fig.1.
10. See Hall & Aspin, supra note 2, at 346-47.
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against judges standing retention elections declined in the years just
prior to and including the 1994 elections, an average of more than
one-third of the total voters rolled off and failed to vote for judges in
all retention elections from 1964 through 1994."
A recent analysis of this phenomenon concludes that rolloff
rates do not correlate with the rate of affirmative votes, or with issues
of trust or lack thereof, and do not necessarily respond to programs
intended to educate voters about judicial retention elections.1
2
Rather, the rate of rolloff appears to turn on the population of the lo-
cale-the greater the population of the voting district, the greater the
rolloff.3
D. Increasing Politicization of Retention Elections
Beginning as early as 1986 in California, another major trend
started, one considered alarming, or even dangerous, by some. The
usually sedate world of judicial retention elections began to look like
an ideological battleground over judicial philosophies and specific
decisions, or series of decisions, as special interest groups and politi-
cians targeted specific state supreme court justices for defeat. This
relatively recent development has turned some othervise low-
salience contests of little import to voters into well-funded, hard-
fought, and emotionally charged contests, as highly salient as races
for overtly political offices.
14
Some prominent examples follow:
1. 1986 California Supreme Court retention election
Since the adoption of its system of retention elections in 1934,
California voters had never failed to retain a justice of its supreme
court.'5 However, in the 1986 general election, Chief Justice Rose
Bird and Justices Joseph Grodin and Cruz Reynoso were ousted.
16
11. See Aspin & Hall, supra note 5, at 12.
12. See id. at 12-13.
13. See id. at 13.
14. See Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization of Retention Elections: Lessons
from the Defeat of Justices Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68 (1999)
(discussing the politicization's threat to judicial retention elections).
15. See Philp Hager, No Opposition, Little Notice for 5 State Justices Up
for Election, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1990, at A3.
16. See Ann Levin, Rose Bird, Two Others Lose Posts, SAN DMEGo UNioN-
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None of the elections were close.1 7 Bird was rejected by 66% of vot-
ers, Reynoso by 60%, and Grodin by 57%.1
In particular, it was their voting records in death penalty cases
that were the subject of the campaign. Bird had voted to reverse
every one of the sixty-one death penalty cases that came before the
court since her appointment nine years earlier.' 9 Reynoso and Gro-
din had voted with her in nearly all of those cases.20 A highly or-
ganized opposition campaign focused on this issue in painting the
Justices as soft on crime.
2 1
In a high profile and intense campaign, "foes and friends of Bird
spent more than $11 million on TV commercials, mailings, and other
campaign [material]. 22 Republican Governor George Deukmejian
and a group of district attorneys from across the state spearheaded
the campaign to unseat Bird.23
After the defeats of Bird and the other justices, many analysts
feared that California's judicial retention process was forever tainted,
and that justices would have to run in bitter political campaigns that
would affect their independence. However, just four years later,
when five justices were up for retention, no organized opposition
formed to unseat them.24 In fact, none of the candidates had to spend
much beyond the $2300 election-filing fee to run.25
It was not until 1998 that state supreme court justices once again
faced serious organized challenges. In that election, Chief Justice
Ronald M. George and Justice Ming W. Chin were targeted by right-
to-life groups for their votes to strike down a state law requiring pa-
rental consent for minors' abortions.26  This opposition forced
George and Chin to raise substantial war chests and mount active
TRIB., Nov. 5, 1986, at Al.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See Hager, supra note 15.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See Robert Greene, High Retention Numbers Show Voters Got Mes-
sage, George Says, METRO. NEWS-ENTERPRISE, Nov. 5, 1998, at 1, LEXIS,
News Library, Newspaper Stories, Combined Papers File.
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campaigns to retain their positions.27 This time, however, the oppo-
sition was not as well-focused or organized and did not enjoy the
support of a political party.28 George won retention with approxi-
mately 75% of the vote, while Chin garnered approximately 69%.2
9
California's contentious 1986 retention election, resulting in a
distinctly different high court for the state provoked a thoughtful and
productive exchange. This pre- and postelection debate centered
around the role of judicial retention elections in general and around
criteria voters should and should not employ in voting for or against
a supreme court justice standing for retention.30 For example, ac-
cording to former Justice Grodin, permissible criteria include a
judge's "subjective value judgments" and various possible "objective
considerations," but not the results reached by the judge in a par-
ticular case or category of cases.
31
2. Tennessee Supreme Court 1996
In 1996, Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White lost her
seat in the first unopposed retention election under Tennessee's
newly adopted merit selection system.32 The experience in Tennes-
see is important, not only as an example of the effects of issue
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See, e.g., Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A
Judge's Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969
(1988) (arguing that voters should not regard a judge as too liberal or conser-
vative, unless the judge's views are so extreme that they lie outside the main-
stream of legal thought and community values); Robert S. Thompson, Judicial
Independence, Judicial Accountability, Judicial Elections, and the California
Supreme Court: Defining the Terms of the Debate, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 812
(1988) (arguing that retention elections are a matter of accommodating judicial
independence with judicial accountability); Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Re-
tention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California Re-
tention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 2007 (1988) (arguing that the
process of judicial selection is inherently unfair to judges); Gerald F. Uelmen,
Commentary: Are We Reprising a Finale or an Overture?, 61 S. CAL. L. REv.
2069 (1988) (arguing that retention elections are unfair to judges because the
challenger, unlike the incumbent judge, has no limits on election tactics or
fund-raising).
31. See Grodin, supra note 30, at 1976-79.
32. See Results in Tennessee, COM. APPEAL, Aug. 3, 1996, at 6A, LEXIS,
News Library, Newspaper Stories, Combined Papers File.
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politics in retention elections, but also for the lesson learned in its
transition from traditional judicial elections to retention elections.
The Governor appointed Justice White to the state supreme
court in 1994 to fill a vacancy on the court that had four years re-
maining on its term.33 Under the new merit plan, she was to face a
retention election in the next statewide election, which took place in
1996, to fill out the rest of the term. 34 Before the election, two law-
yers filed suit to have the 1996 election conducted according to the
old system, a contested partisan election, on the grounds that her ap-
pointment did not involve a judicial evaluating commission as called
for by the new plan.35 A specially constituted appellate court even-
tually ruled that the new plan's retention election provisions applied
to Justice White's candidacy.
36
Justice White endured politically and emotionally charged at-
tacks maintaining that she was "soft on crime," and that she would
not vote in favor of the death penalty.37 The campaign against her
centered on her concurrence in the opinion that overturned the death
sentence in a case many thought deserved the death penalty.
38
She was defeated in the retention election, receiving only a
forty-five percent favorable vote.39 Three other judicial candidates
on the same statewide ballot from Tennessee's intermediate appellate
courts were returned to the bench by significant margins.40 In each
of the three intermediate appellate court retention elections, between
430,000 and 442,000 total votes were cast.41 The consistency in the
number of affirmative votes among the three intermediate appellate
court candidates, each between 282,000 and 288,000, is dramatic
when compared to the number of affirmative votes cast for Justice
33. See Reid, supra note 14, at 70.
34. See id. at 76.
35. See Tennessee, ex rel. Hooker v. Thompson, No. 01S01-9605-CH-
00106, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 839, at *19-21 (Oct. 2, 1996).
36. See id. at *27.
37. See Reid, supra note 14, at 70-72.
38. See id.
39. Seeid. at71.
40. See Results in Tennessee, supra note 32. Judge Jerry L. Smith of the
Court of Criminal Appeals, Judge William M. Barker of the Court of Criminal
Appeals, and Judge Holly Kirby of the Court of Appeals were each retained by
affirmative votes of 66%, 65%, and 65% respectively. See id.
41. See id.
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White, which only approximated 238,000.42 Many voters faced with
the same ballot were able to cast affirmative votes for other judicial
candidates, while voting not to retain Justice White.4 3 Tennessee's
judicial performance evaluation process was not in place until 1998,
leaving voters to rely on media advertising and material distributed
by the judge and the opposition-here, through direct mail and mass
faxing-for candidate information.44
3. 1996 Nebraska Supreme Court
Also, in 1996, Judge David Lanphier became the first supreme
court judge in Nebraska history to lose a retention election.45 This
was his first retention vote after having been appointed to the court in
1992.46 He lost by nearly a two-to-one margin.4 7 Lanphier's defeat
was the result of a well-funded opposition campaign that focused on
Lanphier's votes on two particular issues, the state's second-degree
murder statute and term limits.
48
The dominant issue in Lanphier's retention campaign was the
supreme court's series of decisions that redefined Nebraska's sec-
ond-degree murder statute.49 Lanphier had voted with the majority
in decisions that overturned second-degree murder convictions for
lack of malice.50 The new interpretation of the statute resulted in the
vacating of many murder convictions and the freeing of some previ-
ously convicted of murder.51
The second issue of note in Lanphier's retention election was
that of term limits. In 1994, Lanphier authored a unanimous court
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Telephone Interview with Spruell Driver, Staff Member, Tennessee
Administrative Office of the Courts (Oct. 9, 2000).
45. See Leslie Boellstorff, Lanphier Loses Seat on Supreme Court, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 6, 1996, at 1, LEXIS, News Library, Newspaper Sto-
ries, Combined Papers File.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See Editorial, Foes Blaming Lanphier Too Much; Voters Should Keep
Him in Office, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 2, 1996, at 40, LEXIS, News
Library, Newspaper Stories, Combined Papers File.
50. See id.
51. Seeid.
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opinion that overturned a term limit amendment that voters had ap-
proved in 1992.52 Two years later, Lanphier voted with a four-
member majority to keep a new term limit amendment, along with
four other amendments, from the 1994 ballot, because it had been
submitted to the secretary of state one day beyond the statutory
deadline. 3
These two issues helped to swing public opinion against Lan-
phier.54 A well-financed opposition campaign spent an estimated
$200,000 in the counties that voted on Lanphier's retention.5 5 His
supporters unsuccessfully tried to paint his opposition as being se-
cretly financed by out-of-state interests.5 6 His opponents labeled
Lanphier "soft on crime," among other things.
Were these highly visible retention defeats unique, or were they
harbingers of things to come? One can argue that the bitterly con-
tested retention elections in California, Tennessee, and Nebraska
turned on local issues, personalities, and judicial politics. However,
for some serious commentators, the similarities suggest that judicial
rulings on politically hot-button issues-such as the death penalty,
abortion, and term limits-have accounted for, and in the future will
likely set off, heated and expensive retention contests. 8 According
to some observers of retention elections, the phenomenon is very un-
fortunate and a danger to judicial independence, since it amounts to
the imposition of decisional accountability on the courts and holds
judges to "standards that .. are incompatible with the institutional
integrity of the judiciary."
59
52. See id.
53. See Duggan v. Beerman, 515 N.W.2d 788 (Neb. 1994).
54. See Reid, supra note 14, at 70-71.
55. See Reid, supra note 14, at 72. In Nebraska, each judge is chosen to
represent certain counties, and thus, faces retention election in only those ar-
eas. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-201.02 (1995).
56. See Boellstorff, supra note 45. Lanphier's main opposition refused to
file campaign finance statements with the state election commission, claiming
that retention campaigns were exempt from the law requiring disclosure of
campaign finance statements. See id.
57. See Reid, supra note 14, at 72.
58. See id. at 68-69.
59. Id. at 77.
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E. Lack of Voter Information
Traditionally, state judicial elections in general had been thought
of as inconspicuous and lacking in controversy. 60 The conventional
wisdom held that a "benevolent public" returns a judicial candidate
to office for lack of a reason to turn the judge out.61 While these
conditions may have provided judicial retention candidates with
some sense of security, the lack of voter information about judicial
candidates has been cause for growing concern among commenta-
tors.
62
Recent public opinion and voting behavior studies have indi-
cated that voters wish they had more information about judicial can-
didates. 63 The available evidence shows that voters know little about
their choices. In fact, some voter surveys reveal that most voters had
difficulty recalling the names of judicial candidates.6 Most judicial
retention elections have traditionally been even less visible than their
contested counterparts, and therefore, more prone to problems relat-
ing to lack of voter information. 65 Because a judge does not face an
opponent, but instead runs on his or her record, there are usually no
campaigns, no issues, and no combative personal confrontations.
66
Judicial retention elections tend to be issueless and colorless,
60. See DAVID W. NEUBAUER, JUDICIAL PROCESS: LAW, COURTS &
POLmCs IN THE UNITED STATES 144-45 (1991) (discussing low voter aware-
ness in judicial elections). See generally Anthony Champagne & Greg
Theilemann, Awareness of Trial Court Judges, 74 JUDICATURE 271 (1991)
(discussing problematic aspects of the lack of voter awareness in judicial elec-
tions); Marie Hojnacki & Lawrence Baum, Choosing Judicial Candidates:
How Voters Explain their Decisions, 75 JUDICATURE 300 (1992) (discussing
the results of telephone surveys with Wyoming and Ohio voters conducted
postjudicial elections).
61. See NEUBAUER, supra note 60, at 145-46.
62. See NEUBAUER, supra note 60, at 145; Hojnacki & Baum, supra note
60, at 300.
63. See, e.g., Robert G. Boatright & Kevin M. Esterling, Methodological
Issues in the Study of Judicial Selection: A Critique of the Empirical Research
and Suggestions for Future Directions, in RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL SELECTIONS
1999, at 77, 101 (American Judicature Society ed., 2000).
64. See Hojnacki & Baum, supra note 60, at 300.
65. See id.
66. See id.
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generally failing to generate much publicity, positive or negative,
about incumbent judges.
67
Further evidence suggests that judicial voters rely heavily on
cues, such as name recognition and information provided on the
ballot itself.68 For instance, ballots in contested elections often place
the title "Judge" on the ballot next to the incumbent, inadvertently
discouraging challengers.69 Also, partisan judicial elections indicate
party affiliation on the ballot, which may be a primary cue for many
judicial election voters.7°
F. Growth in Judicial Performance Evaluation Programs
Five states-Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Tennessee, and Utah-
have responded to the problem of lack of voter information by
adopting official performance evaluation mechanisms for judicial
retention election candidates.7'
Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission (JPEC) reports
generally have two audiences, voters and judges, serving the fol-
lowing dual purposes: (1) informing voters in their decision of
whether or not to retain a judge, and (2) providing relatively objec-
tive feedback to judges in areas they may need to improve. 72 Typi-
cally, the membership of JPECs are a healthy mix ofjudges, lawyers,
and members of the public-at-large. 73 To underscore the importance
of a diverse evaluation commission, the Arizona Supreme Court, un-
der its rules, states that the commission membership should reflect
67. See NEUBAUER, supra note 60, at 144.
68. See Hojnacki & Baum, supra note 60, at 300-01.
69. See NEUBAUER, supra note 60, at 145.
70. See id. at 144.
71. See CITIZENS FOR INDEPENDENT COURTS, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE:
POLITICS AND AMERICA'S COURTS: THE REPORTS OF THE TASK FORCES OF
CITIZENS FOR INDEPENDENT COURTS 99 (2000), available at http://www.
constitutionproject.org/ci/reports/uncertainjustice.pdf [hereinafter UNCERTAIN
JUSTICE].
72. See KEVIN M. ESTERLING & KATHLEEN M. SAMPSON, JUDICIAL
RETENTION EVALUATION PROGRAMS IN FOUR STATES: A REPORT WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS 21 (1998). See also UNCERTAIN JUSTICE, supra note 71,
at 98-99 (discussing the need to remedy the lack of information in voter reten-
tion elections).
73. See UNCERTAIN JUSTICE, supra note 71, at 98.
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"to the extent possible, the geographic, ethnic, racial, and gender di-
versity.. ." of the state.
74
Strategies for public dissemination of JPEC reports vary from
state to state.75 For example, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, and Utah
mail findings to all registered voters as a part of the voter guide for
each election cycle.76 In Alaska, Arizona, and Colorado, findings are
placed on Web pages.77 In addition, in Alaska and Colorado, find-
ings are run in advertisements in local newspapers.7
Despite state efforts to disseminate information, many voters are
not receiving or making use of the evaluation reports. 9 A study of
retention elections in 1996 found that, in Alaska and Colorado, just
58% and approximately 55% of voters, respectively, reported aware-
ness of judicial performance evaluation reports.80 Exit polls in Ari-
zona and Utah indicated even less awareness of such reports among
voters.8 1 Further, the study showed that even fewer voters took ad-
vantage of information in these reports.82 While these statistics are
from relatively small samples, the implications are discouraging,
considering state efforts to disseminate evaluation reports.
H. CURRENTLY PENDING REFORM PROPOSALS
Many of the reforms advocated for traditional judicial elections
have also been suggested for retention elections when the incumbent
has significant opposition. For example:
1. Expand and Improve Judicial Performance Evaluation (JPE)
At a minimum, judges standing retention should receive a thor-
ough performance evaluation before each election-the results of the
74. ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 72, at 23 & tbl.II-l.
75. See id. at 28, 29 tbl.lI-4.
76. See id. at 29 tbl.llI-4.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 37 tbl.IV-1.
80. See id.
81. See id. In Arizona and Utah, approximately 30% and approximately
50%, respectively, reported awareness of judicial performance evaluation re-
ports. See id.
82. See id. The question asked at exit polls was "Did you obtain any in-
formation based on this official report?" Affirmative responses: Anchorage
(approximately 33%), Phoenix Suburbs (approximately 11%), Denver (ap-
proximately 36%), Salt Lake City (approximately 35%). See id.
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JPE to be used for the judge's self-improvement, the training and
education of other judges, and for the education of the electorate.
83
Proponents of JPE stress that the JPE commission needs to be public,
independent, and firm but fair.84 JPE is discussed at greater length in
another article in this issue.
85
2. Regulate Campaign Fund-Raising and Expenditures
Campaign contributions and expenditures, on behalf of and in
opposition to a judge whose retention is actively opposed, should be
subject to full public disclosure in forms readily accessible to the
public both before and after the election. 86 In addition, public fi-
nancing of contested retention elections ought to be seriously consid-
ered.87
3. Police Campaign Statements and Tactics
The fairness and accuracy of campaign statements and materials
should be fostered by guidelines, voluntary or otherwise, and moni-
tored by committees with the mandate and authority to publicize
violations on a timely basis.88 State judicial ethics rules ought to be
examined to ensure that the judge challenged in a retention election
setting has sufficient latitude to make effective responses.
89
83. See A. John Pelander, Judicial Performance Review in Arizona: Goals
Practical Effects and Concerns, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 643, 650-51 (1998).
84. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON JUD. INDEP., COMM'N ON JUD.
SELECTION STANDARDS 25 (2000) ("A retention evaluation body should oper-
ate in a manner that is consistent with the goal of achieving and maintaining a
qualified, inclusive, and independent judiciary."); UNCERTAIN JUSTICE, supra
note 71, at 99-100 (discussing the need for adequate funding for proper con-
ducting, interpreting, and dissemination of results). See also SARA MATHIAS,
ELECTING JUSTICE: A HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL ELECTION REFORMS 20-22
(1990) (discussing various judicial performance evaluation programs); Reid,
supra note 14, at 77 (discussing the use of objective evaluations to offset the
effect of special interest groups in retention elections).
85. See Seth S. Andersen, Judicial Retention Evaluation Programs, 34
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1375 (2001).
86. See UNCERTAIN JUSTICE, supra note 71, at 94; Reid, supra note 14, at
76.
87. See MATHIAS, supra note 84, at 45-47 (evaluating the pros and cons of
public funding programs).
88. Seeid. at31-43.
89. See Reid, supra note 14, at 76 (favoring the approach taken in the Ten-
nessee Code of Judicial Conduct adopted in 1997).
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4. Impose Filing Deadline for Opponents (Proposal Unique to
Retention Elections)
Filing deadlines should be imposed for opponents of incumbent
judges. This call for change is relevant only to retention elections,
since existing laws already provide deadlines for the filing of one's
candidacy in traditional judicial elections. However, apparently
there is no such requirement for those wishing to actively oppose an
incumbent judge's retention. A serious student of judicial elections
recommends that a timely notice of such an intent be required by law
so that the appropriate public officials agencies, or committees; the
candidate; and public-at-large have reasonable notice.
90
I. CONCLUSION
Despite the twin and somewhat contradictory concerns about the
efficacy of judicial retention elections-voter frustration and apathy
on the one hand, and the threat posed by politicization over hot-
button issues on the other hand-some say that the retention form
comes the closest to striking an appropriate balance between the
competing goals of judicial independence and accountability to the
public.9' It has also been said that "contested retention elections are
the most unfair system of all judicial elections."
92
Whatever one's ultimate view on the efficacy of retention elec-
tions, enough states have had sufficient experience with the retention
system to permit us to identify both its strengths and weaknesses and
to work for needed improvement.
90. See id. at 76.
91. See id. at 77 (discussing advantages of judicial retention elections if in-
corporated with merit selection).
92. Uelmen, supra note 30, at 2073 (discussing implications of California's
1986 retention election).
June 2001] 1441
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 34:1429
APPENDIX
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RETENTION ELECTIONS
The first judicial selection and retention system to use retention
elections appeared in 1934 in California.93 That system called for
judicial vacancies to be filled by gubernatorial appointment with ap-
proval by a commission.94 After a short period of time, the newly
appointed judge would face an uncontested retention election where
voters would be presented with the question, "Should Judge Xbe re-
tained in office, Yes or No?" 95 In 1937, the American Bar Associa-
tion endorsed retention elections for judges.
96
Missouri refined and adopted a different version of California's
selection and retention plan in 1940.97 The "Missouri Bar Plan," also
termed "merit selection," and its later variants, combine elements of
gubernatorial appointment, popular election, citizen involvement,
and a formal role for the legal profession in the selection process.
98
Under the Missouri Bar Plan, a commission consisting of lawyers
and laypersons nominates qualified judicial candidates. 99 The com-
mission's candidate list then goes to the governor who selects a can-
didate from the list to fill the position. 00 Finally, similar to the Cali-
fornia system, the judge faces a retention election during the next
election cycle and at regular intervals thereafter.'1
0
By 1966, five states had adopted some form of the Missouri Bar
Plan to select appellate court judges and justices.10 2 Other states, like
California, had also incorporated retention elections into the
93. See Grodin, supra note 30, at 1972.
94. See NEUBAUER, supra note 60, at 144.
95. Grodin, supra note 30, at 1971 (discussing the federal model of judge
selection).
96. See R. Darcy, Conflict and Reform: Oklahoma Judicial Elections 1907-
1998, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
97. See DAvID W. NEUBAUER, AMERICA'S COURTS AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 191 (6th ed. 1999) [hereinafter AMERICA'S COURTS].
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See Darcy, supra note 96. Those states include Alaska, Iowa, Kansas,
Missouri, and Nebraska. See id.
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selection and retention process; however, those selection processes
were driven solely by gubernatorial appointment, rather than by
commission nomination.1
0 3
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF RETENTION ELECTIONS
Currently, twenty states use retention elections at the appellate
court level; however, not all strictly adhere to the Missouri Bar
Plan.' 4 Three states-Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Utah-added
the requirement of senate approval. 05 California has a Commission
on Judicial Appointment that may veto the gubernatorial appoint-
ment after determining that the chosen candidate is not qualified. 06
103. See NEUBAUER, supra note 60, at 144.
104. See DAVID B. ROTrmAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT
ORGs. 1998, at 21-25 tbl.4 (2000); infra Table 1.
105. See id.
106. See Stephen . Barnett, California Justice, 78 CAL. L. REV. 247, 259
n.51 (1990) (reviewing JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE:
REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE (1989)). The members of
the commission are the state's chiefjustice, the senior judge of the court of ap-
peals, and the attorney general. See id.
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TABLE 1 - INITIAL APPOINTMENT OF APPELLATE COURT JUDGES IN
RETENTION ELECTION STATES
Gubernatorial Appointment Contestable
Election
From a Judicial Nomi- No Nominating Commis- No Nominating
nating Commission sion Commission
No Consent Consent of No Consent Consent of No Consent of
of the State the State of the State the State Re- the State Re-
Required Required Required quired quired
Alaska Maryland California Pennsylvania Illinois (Partisan)
Arizona Utah Montana* (Non-
Colorado partisan)
Florida New Mexico
Indiana (Partisan)
Iowa
Kansas
Missouri
Nebraska
Oklahoma
South
Dakota
Tennessee
Wyoming
Note: Table derived from data contained in the State Court Organization
1998107
* Montana utilizes retention elections only if the incumbent runs unopposed.
At the trial court level, retention elections are utilized in twelve
states.'0 8 Initial judicial appointments resemble the Missouri Bar
Plan in nine states, while two states, Pennsylvania and Illinois, utilize
partisan popular elections to make initial selections. Only two of
these twelve states use retention elections for all of their trial court
judges. Four states limit the use of judicial retention elections based
on the trial court's geographical location, while nine states limit the
use of judicial retention elections based on trial court type. Arizona,
for example, uses retention elections only for its superior court
107. See ROTTMAN, supra note 104, at 21-25 tbl.4.
108. See id. at 34-49, tbl.7; infra Table 2.
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judges, and only in its two largest counties. Kansas uses the Mis-
souri Bar Plan in seventeen of its district courts, while using partisan
elections for both selection and retention in the other fourteen dis-
tricts.
109
TABLE 2 - INITIAL APPOINTmENT OF TRIAL COURT JUDGES IN
RETENTION ELECTION STATES
Gubernatorial Ap- Magistrate
pointment from aJudile fomnan Commission Contested Election
Judicial Nominating Appointment
Commission 
__Appointment
Alaskat Idahot Illinois (Partisan)
Arizonat* Pennsylvania (Parti-
Coloradot san)t
Iowat
Kansast*
Missourit*
Nebraska
Utah*
Wyomingt
Note: Table derived from data contained in State Court Organi-
zations 199810
* Limited use of retention elections based on the trial court's
geographical location.
t Limited use of retention elections based on trial court type.
109. See id.
110. See id.
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